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Abstract
The ‘footprint’ concept is widely used as an indicator to assess CO2 
emissions and the water embodied in crop production. A comparison 
of key features reveals that CO2 footprints are a global concern no 
matter their location or source; water footprints only have local 
relevance, being locally generated and impacting only at local levels. 
As such, addressing excessive water use is a local concern. Where 
excessive use is not managed, a process of ‘chaotic disallocation’ from 
irrigated agriculture ensues, resulting in reduced local production 
and, through market mechanisms, increased demand elsewhere. 
Those areas where water scarcity is managed sustainably will see 
more profitable opportunities for irrigated production, though 
the impact on prices will be of little concern to consumers in the 
developed world.
Keywords footprints, sustainable water resources management, 
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In 1993, Tony Allan introduced the phrase ‘virtual water’ (Allan, 1993), setting out the concept that all goods 
– but, most importantly, agricultural 
products – utilise water in their 
production. Thus, trade in agricultural 
commodities can also be viewed as a trade 
in the water embodied in the production 
process – ‘saving’ the importing country 
from allocating its own water resources. 
This concept of virtual water provided 
the underpinning for the development of 
water footprints (Hoekstra et al., 2011). 
Water for agriculture dominates 
demand in most water-scarce regions 
(Richter et al., 2017), so that the primary 
focus of attention has been on crops and 
trade in agricultural commodities. Crop 
water footprints – the water that a crop 
transpires through its foliage as part of the 
process of biomass formation – have 
gained acceptance as a revealing indicator 
of the pressure on a resource that is 
overexploited in many countries. Many see 
a parallel between carbon footprints and 
water footprints (Ercin and Hoekstra, 
2012). 
At first glance, the parallel with carbon 
footprints seems obvious: reducing our 
carbon footprint reduces the damaging 
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impact of CO2 on the world’s climate. 
Good! Similarly, reducing our water 
footprint alleviates pressure on a scarce 
and critical resource. Good? Not necessarily. 
Water is more complicated than 
carbon in several respects. CO2 emissions 
are an unambiguous and universal metric: 
one gram of emissions from a car driven 
in Canberra equates to one gram of 
emissions from a power station in Cape 
Town. In contrast, the water footprint of 
a crop is typically composed of one or 
more of several diverse components: non-
renewable water pumped from a fossil 
aquifer; water diverted from a river; water 
‘harvested’ from local run-off; and/or 
water that landed directly on a field as 
rainfall. And the water that landed as 
rainfall would, in the absence of a crop, 
have been utilised just as fully by natural 
vegetation, so that the ‘footprint’ of the 
crop when compared to the natural 
alternative may be zero.  
In sum, where water comes from is 
complicated; how we use it is complicated; 
and where it goes after use is complicated. 
These complexities have profound 
implications for the relevance of water 
footprints to water policy at local, regional 
and global levels, which are explored in 
more detail below. Using the attributes of 
carbon footprints provides important 
insights into what the future holds for areas 
where water is currently overexploited. 
Carbon footprints are global; water footprints 
are local 
Perhaps the most important difference 
between carbon footprints and water 
footprints is that water is a local resource 
whose use has local impacts. Scarcity 
or excess, seasonal supply and demand, 
the customs and institutions governing 
allocation are all local variables and the 
range of possible combinations of these 
is almost infinite. No doubt the domain 
that constitutes ‘local’ may range from 
two neighbours sharing a well to several 
countries sharing a basin, but the ‘water’ 
domain is never global, and in that sense 
is always local. In contrast, CO2 emissions 
are CO2 emissions no matter what the 
source, where they occur, or when; they 
are always global and never local.
The fact that water footprints are local 
has important implications: ‘my’ local 
water use for washing, cooking or watering 
my garden does not affect a water user 
anywhere outside my ‘locality’. More 
generally, if I give up sugar in my coffee, 
the resulting fall in global demand for sugar 
will result in reduced production, 
somewhere. It may result in reduced 
production in Maharashtra, where sugar 
cane production depends heavily on 
unsustainable groundwater use. If so, 
pressure on the local groundwater 
resources will be reduced, which is a good 
outcome for the local water economy. 
Alternatively, if the reduction in production 
occurs in the West Indies, where sugar cane 
production is based on rainfall that will 
wet the ground and vegetation, there will 
be no benefits to the local water economy: 
the rain will continue to fall, and vegetation 
of some type will capture and transpire a 
proportion of that rainfall. There is no 
guarantee that the reduced global demand 
for sugar will result in an economically or 
environmentally rational response. The 
local and the global are not logically 
connected (Perry, 2014). 
This is not to say that widespread 
failure of water systems (aquifers too saline 
or too deep for exploitation; rivers 
seasonally dry causing environmental 
collapse, etc.) will not have implications 
for global food production; there is clearly 
a link, but disaggregating the local impacts 
of water management from global concerns 
about food security and the ecosystem 
reveals the heterogeneity of the likely losers 
(and winners) from problems in the water 
sector.
Water (mis)management is case by case
If a country, like New Zealand, mismanages 
its water, the sectors that currently depend 
on that water will eventually and inevitably 
suffer ‘disallocation’ of water – first from 
the environment, which is what we already 
commonly observe, and then, typically, 
from irrigated agriculture. Human 
interference in the water cycle, especially 
to support irrigation, has as its objective 
the increased local consumption of water 
by crops. This artificially induced increase 
in consumption, supported by abstraction 
from an aquifer, or diversion from a river, 
affects the balance between inflows and 
outflows, and will have consequences. 
Mother nature will combine forces with the 
law of conservation of mass to ensure that 
this happens: wells will go dry, or saline, 
or too deep for economic exploitation; 
downstream abstractors from rivers will 
increasingly frequently find the river is dry 
or too saline for use. This process is already 
widely evident (Falkenmark, Lundqvist 
and Widstrand, 1989; Leblanc et al., 2011; 
MacDonald et al., 2016; Perry, Steduto and 
Karajeh, 2017).
As long as water demand is constrained 
to be well within the average renewable 
supply, with acceptable environmental 
outcomes, the water economy (and 
irrigated agriculture) can to some extent 
absorb shocks. On the supply side, aquifers 
can be over-drafted in times of drought 
and allowed to replenish in times of above-
average precipitation; surface water 
reservoirs can be operated to carry over 
storage to mitigate low-flow years (for 
example, Aswan can retain about twice the 
average inflow to Egypt from the Nile). 
Equally importantly, on the demand side, 
if farmers plant a significant proportion of 
annual crops (grains, cotton, forage, etc.), 
they can reduce the area planted when 
advised that water is scarce, or even 
abandon a crop in mid-season at relatively 
minor cost. Once perennials are established 
(vines, orchards, nuts), this flexibility is 
severely constrained because farmers will 
protect their long-term investment using 
whatever water source they can access – 
usually unsustainable groundwater (Dinar, 
1994). Similarly, irrigating forage for a 
dairy enterprise supports a demand that 
cannot be abandoned temporarily during 
Mismanagement of water ... is leading 
... to chaotic disallocation of water from 
agriculture.
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a drought. Demand is thus less flexible, 
while the supply is at or beyond the margin 
of sustainability so that the capacity to 
absorb variations in precipitation is limited.
What we have observed over recent 
years is that water resources are being 
widely exploited beyond the renewable 
margin (Panda, Mishra and Kumar, 2012; 
Famiglietti, 2014; Leblanc et al., 2011; 
OECD, 2015; MacDonald et al., 2016). 
The observed depletion of aquifers and 
damage to river ecosystems – and farmers 
are tending to move to higher value, 
perennial crops that they are unwilling to 
abandon in times of drought – is almost 
universal. The consequence, inevitably, is 
shocks to the system – isolated, short-
term and usually local shocks rather than 
the progressive global catastrophe 
envisioned in some global warming 
scenarios, which again highlights the 
difference between CO2 emissions and 
water footprints. 
In the water sector, this local process is 
likely to be – indeed often is – chaotic. The 
sequence in which wells become unusable 
is determined in part by the resources of 
individual farmers – how deep is his well? 
What are the neighbours doing? – and in 
part by the specific hydrogeology of the 
location – one farmer sits over an area of 
fresh groundwater; the next has to tap a 
deeper aquifer. A similar process will 
unfold with surface water: upstream 
abstraction and consumption will render 
downstream areas dry or supplied 
sporadically, perhaps only with increasingly 
saline water. These processes will not be 
orderly, prioritised or predictable.  
Add to this the short-term variations in 
the weather: Australia in 2018 was 
experiencing a severe drought; 
simultaneously, California was 
experiencing excessive precipitation. The 
previous year was essentially the reverse. 
Who will not have water next year? We 
really do not know.
And the process is already ongoing. In 
some regions, farmers, their families and 
the local economy are suffering badly. 
Migration from agriculture to cities has 
many drivers, but unstable and decreasing 
availability of water is certainly one of 
them. The ‘environment’ in many areas is 
already suffering, very badly. And the 
pursuit of individual and entirely rational 
self-interest when the resource is open-
access ensures that the ‘tragedy of the 
commons’ (Hardin, 1968) is a powerful 
explanatory paradigm. 
While this long-term imbalance 
between how much water there is and how 
much we would like to have is unavoidable, 
the process of chaotic disallocation as the 
law of conservation of mass plays out is 
primarily a local issue, depending on how 
close to the renewable margin the water 
system is operating, and how flexible the 
response to scarcity is. Does the system 
have the capacity to absorb short-term 
fluctuations in supply, complemented by 
some flexibility in demand? Increasingly, 
neither is the case. 
Water management is also case by case
Mismanagement of water will lead – is 
leading – to chaotic disallocation of water 
from agriculture. An alternative process 
of managed disallocation driven by local 
policies, regulations and institutions is 
possible, however. Whether countries opt 
to adopt such approaches is within their 
own power. When implemented effectively, 
disallocation will be policy driven, 
transparent, prioritised and scheduled 
over time, thus minimising costs, allowing 
progressive adjustments, and providing 
compensation where appropriate. 
If (for example) water consumption in 
specific irrigated areas must fall by 20% in 
order to re-establish the local average 
balance between renewable supply and 
demand, we can anticipate that agricultural 
production will fall. Chaotic disallocation 
will probably maximise the impact on 
production for several reasons: first, a given 
level of uncertain supply will be less 
productively used than the same average 
level of assured supply because the farmer 
will invest more in inputs to maximise the 
productivity of assured water. Second, 
disallocation will randomly remove water 
from all farmers, including the most 
productive. Managed disallocation, by 
contrast, can be planned over time, and 
targeted on the least productive farmers or 
crops, and will consequently have a lower 
impact, encouraging the most rational 
responses to reduced supply. These could 
include abandoning the least productive 
uses of water through adjusted commodity 
policies, market mechanisms such as 
buying out water rights, or allowing trade 
of water allocations among farmers.
Thus, we see that individual countries 
and regions have it largely in their own 
hands as to whether the water resources 
relevant to their livelihoods are managed 
sustainably – a clear and substantial 
difference from the global carbon economy.
Winners and losers
Looking beyond the local water economy 
and turning to the global picture, we see 
a second important difference between 
the water and the carbon economies: the 
potential for at least some winners to 
emerge (somewhere else) as a result of 
local water management failures.
The impact of reduced production in 
some areas will be an increase in crop 
prices both locally and, to a lesser extent, 
more widely. This will induce a new 
equilibrium as those farmers who still have 
access to water are incentivised to farm 
more productively, and some farmers who 
were previously uncompetitive, despite 
having access to renewable water supplies, 
are able to enter the market.
This last outcome is again a fundamental 
difference between the water and carbon 
footprint paradigms. Inadequate 
management of carbon emissions is bad 
for those emitting excessive levels of CO2 
Those most affected by chaotic 
disallocation ... are also those least able 
to afford the associated increases in food 
costs. 
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and bad for everybody else in the world. 
There are no benefits and no winners – we 
all lose. 
There will be winners from the 
disallocation of water from irrigated 
agriculture, and some of those winners are 
currently relatively poor rain-fed farmers. 
Consumers of agricultural produce will 
experience a small increase in prices; 
farmers ‘captured’ by the chaotic 
disallocation will suffer a large fall in 
income, while farmers involved in managed 
disallocation will also lose, but in a more 
predictable way (and still be farming as 
crop prices rise).
So the water crisis will have losers and 
winners, and a prime determinant of which 
category farmers fall into will be governance. 
Where governments fulfil their obligation 
to manage a nation’s resources sustainably 
for the common good, the outlook for 
irrigated agriculture remains positive. 
Where governments fail in that duty, the 
prospects are poor, and the negative 
consequences are potentially very long-term. 
Once an aquifer is exploited to 
destruction, some or all of three things can 
happen: first, the remaining water is so 
deep that recharge takes many years to 
reach it and initiate replenishment; second, 
the residual water is saline and depends on 
extensive recharge to re-establish a usable 
freshwater layer above the saline residue; 
and third, the previously porous aquifer-
supporting soil structure compresses so 
that the storage potential and permeability 
are destroyed. This last condition is 
permanent. River ecosystems are perhaps 
more complicated, but again the challenges 
to restoring damage rise exponentially with 
the extent and duration of over-
exploitation of upstream water. 
And lastly: who cares?
If the climate does spiral out of control 
as a result of global warming, driven by 
excessive CO2 emissions, few dispute that 
all of us will suffer severely, directly or 
indirectly, from the consequences of these 
events. The impacts will not be evenly 
distributed across nations or citizens, but 
the impacts will be dramatically negative 
for the vast majority of life on this planet. 
We all should care about this, and most 
people do. 
How will water crises play out? Locally, 
as argued above, there will be substantial 
negative impacts for those directly affected, 
in terms of production and income. 
Elsewhere, some farmers will be better off, 
and, more generally, the global market for 
commodities will adjust. 
The precise scale of the changes in 
commodity prices as a result of 
disallocation of water from irrigated 
agriculture is beyond the scope of this 
article (and this author). However, an 
IFPRI study (Rosegrant, Cai and Cline, 
2002) provides helpful guidance, as 
interpreted by this author. The study 
concluded that eliminating over-
abstraction from aquifers would reduce 
global irrigated cereal production by 35 
million metric tonnes, which would be 
partially offset by an increase in rain-fed 
production of 17 million metric tonnes, 
stimulated by average price rises of around 
7%. This average price increase is greatly 
ameliorated by the impact of world trade 
(Liu et al., 2014). In the areas where 
production is directly affected by reduced 
water availability – often remote and 
distant from markets – the impact will be 
much more severe.  
At one end of the spectrum, for those 
urban and rural poor who depend on 
buying commodities for their staple diets, 
this will be a severe impact as they spend 
as much as 35% of their income on food 
– rice, wheat, vegetables, etc. At the other 
end of the spectrum, it is estimated that 
New Zealanders spend 14% of their after-
tax income on food (Cronshaw, 2014), and 
that the commodity component of that 
food (i.e. excluding processing, packaging, 
transport, etc.) accounts for only 10% of 
the total cost of food. So a 7% rise in 
commodity prices would imply a 0.1% rise 
in food prices, corresponding to a 0.14% 
rise in the cost of living. The relevance of 
the ‘who cares?’ question becomes obvious. 
To sum up, CO2 emissions constitute a 
local contribution to a global concern, such 
that we ‘all’ care. Thus, there is obvious and 
effective scope to invoke peer pressure at a 
global scale. However, mismanagement of 
water is a local issue based on local failure 
of government to exercise its appropriate 
function for the specific benefit of those in 
that same domain of mismanagement. 
Beyond that domain, in areas where water 
is not scarce, or where it is properly 
managed, producers of agricultural 
commodities will benefit from failures 
elsewhere as demand for their production 
increases. 
At the global scale, most consumers of 
agricultural produce will barely notice the 
change in prices induced by the progressive 
collapse of some water systems. Those most 
affected by chaotic disallocation of water 
from their agricultural incomes are also 
those least able to afford the associated 
increases in food costs. The priority is thus 
to promote good governance of water 
resources in advance of scarcity. 
The upside of this gloomy picture is, of 
course, that local interventions can lead to 
better local outcomes independently of the 
wider picture of water mismanagement. 
That more optimistic scenario is 
another contrast with the CO2 story. 
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“Across the world, biodiversity is plummeting. 
The numbers are unprecedented and they 
are terrifying: estimates are that we are now 
losing species at 1,000 to 10,000 times the 
background or natural rate. Nowhere is the 
loss of biodiversity more pronounced than here 
in New Zealand.” 
 Mike Joy, IGPS newsletter editorial, April 2019
“In its much awaited first well-being budget, 
New Zealand’s coalition government missed a 
major trick in not making unemployment one of 
their central well-being priorities.” 
Simon Chapple, IGPS newsletter editorial, June 2019
“The current tax and transfer system does 
not achieve the fairness and justice the 
Tax Working Group was asked to consider. 
Nor does it promote economic efficiency or 
environmental sustainability.” 
Michael Fletcher, IGPS newsletter editorial, August 2019
IGPS NEWSLETTER
Every fortnight the IGPS sends out a free newsletter, with editorials by IGPS research staff offering 
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those run by Victoria University’s School of Government 
and others our subscribers might find interesting. 
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Strike 4 Climate movement, His Excellency Seung-bae 
Yeo, ambassador to New Zealand from the Republic of 
Korea, Thomas Simonson, co-author of Local Government 
New Zealand’s report on sea level rise, and Peter Fraser, 
economist and a leading authority on the dairy industry. 
To subscribe to the newsletter, send an email 
to igps@vuw.ac.nz with subject line “subscribe to 
newsletter”. 
